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Intro uction
Economics is about transactions among people in which
everybody affected is a voluntary participant. This is what a
free market is all about, and most Americans (and our worldwide cousins) appreciate and want this freedom. Yet, we all
know that even a free market for it to work at all must rest on
well-defined property rights and duties, and on rules about
such things as what is meant by a standard unit of transaction like a "bushel." A market also needs good and high
quality information, protection for those not a part of the
transaction, and, most importantly, trust. We cannot voluntarily participate unless we trust. We might say there is a
moral dimension in the foundation of a free market, something that must be built.
This 1997 outlook report starts by addressing the play of
the market for world food (modest price increases expected) and overall farm income factors. It moves to examining how government, which has been a major factor in helping
people put a foundation under the free market for decades, is now a much less important
part of agriculture. The move is to more voluntary participation, i.e., to markets. Concentration, while having its benefits, could also reduce voluntary participation and be a negative force: there are always tradeoffs, with opportunities lost and gained. Attention is then
turned to the inputs
the land and water, so crucial in Nebraska- and how to think
about machinery decisions. Commodity price and production outlook follows: how and
why prices react (really, how and why people in the markets act and react) need to be
understood. Our 1997 report concludes with a section on The bottom line: what kind of
debt load and rates of return are Nebraska farmers experiencing? Perhaps most importantly, we end with some research information collected in our new rural poll (in which
many of you participated: thanks!) on how farmers and rural residents see their quality of
life, and the future.
The pace of the move to markets is rapid in the United States. Witness also the major
changes especially in Europe, but also in Asia, Mrica and Latin/South America: The
market is becoming an ever stronger force across the world. These are exciting economic
times. Our goal here (and our continuing goal) is to help you make sense out of them. We
write what we do because economics is a behavioral science which tries to explain voluntary participation within a moral dimension, as well as t:he main science underlying
family, business, community and public decisions. Only you can make these decisions.
We hope these will be better decisions because we have been helpful in improving your
understanding.
I will appreciate receiving any comments you have about this report, or any other
part of our educational program. Drop me a note, give me a call, or e-mail me at
agecOOl@unlvm.unl.edu- I look forward to hearing from you. Thank you for your
interest in and support of our program and efforts.
Gary D. Lynne
Agricultural Economics Professor and Department Head
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Richard K. Pe:rrin
Richard K. Penin

World population is certain to
rise substantially over the next
35 years, and with it the demand
for food. The United Nations
makes three growth rate projections: 0.9 percent (a 30 percent
increase by 2030), 1.2 percent (a
50 percent increase) and 1.5 percent (a 65 percent increase).
Therefore, food shortage appears
to some to be inevitable, accompanied by increases in grain, food
and land prices. I want to examine some reasons to believe
otherwise.

Higher resource productivity.
An increase in productivity is an
increase in output from a given
set of inputs. If world agricultural
productivity increases by 0.9-1.5
percent per year, the expanded
population could be fed with the
current agricultural base, at no
increase in food prices. Is this
plausible? I think so. Between
1960 and 1990, U.S. agricultural
productivity rose twice this fast
(an annual rate of 1.9 percent). In
nine other industrialized countries, productivity growth for
1973-1989 was measured at
about 1.8 percent per year. In
China, India and a number of
other countries agricultural productivity jell in the '60s and '70s
but rebounded in the '80s to
levels comparable to those above.
A world-wide agricultural productivity growth rate of 1 percent
seems quite plausible.
More resources are available
for production. If productivity
growth should fall behind popu4

lation growth, we can expect
food prices to rise enough to
attract more resources into production. Would the additional
resources be available at
modest price increases?
Land

In the '80's, cropland reductions in the United States and the
former Soviet Union almost
exactly offset increases in cropland in the rest of the world. If
over the next 35 years these idled
acres were returned to production and net forest conversions
were to continue at recent rates,
the average rate of cropland
increase would be about 0.7 percent per year, slightly below the
minimum projected population
growth rate. A return of idled cropland would incur environmental
consequences, but probably less
severe than in the past because of
more environmentally-friendly
production technologies. Conversion of tropical forests presents a
more serious challenge for the
scientific community to discover
environmentally-friendly technologies, for it seems clear that if
productivity fails to provide, we
will surely allow these forestlands
to be converted rather than see
people starve.
Wate:r

Agricultural irrigation constitutes about 40 percent of the total
human uses of water. If we can
provide food needs with produc-

tivi1y, we won't need more irrigation. If human use increases with
the rate of population, we would
exhaust about 70 percent of the
accessible runoff by 2030, compared to about 54 percent today.
There is concen1 that such an
increase could result in a severe
faltering of aquatic ecosystem services. These consequences might
be avoided if greater efficiencies
were achieved in iiTigation water
use, but despite technological
opportunities for this (drip irrigation, recycling, etc.), it has not
occurred because there has been
little incentive for producers. An
end to the subsidies of many irrigated areas would stimulate
water efficiency without increasing food plices. The twin prospects of greater runoff capture
and better water efficiency provide some assurance of increased
production if productivity growth
should prove inadequate to meet
food needs.

Implications for Nebraska:
Because of the prospects for continued productivity improvements, world food prices should
increase only modestly, if at all,
providing only weak incentives
for an increase in resources
devoted to agriculture in
Nebraska. Additional land may
be brought into production, and
additional water efficiency will be
achieved, but the face of agriculture in Nebraska will not change
much between now and 2030,
despite changes in producHon
techniques and patterns.
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Roy Frederick
Early indications are that
1996 may turn out to be a year
of record income for Nebraska
farmers. If that's the case, excellent crop yields and good crop
prices will have been primarily
responsible.
Unfortunately, good crop
prices translate into high feed
costs for livestock producers.
It's difficult, perhaps impossible, for all Nebraska producers
to prosper at the same time.
As we look to 1997, several
factors are likely to affect the
profitability of Nebraska
agriculture. Key question: Is the
1996 experience the standard
for the future or a brief flash in
the pan?
Record high corn and wheat
prices during the spring and
summer of 1996 were caused
primarily by low production in
1995. This reduced carryover
stocks to extremely low levels at
the end of the 1995-96 marketing year. While carryover of
most commodities will be up at
the end of the 1996-97 marketing year, it still would not be
surprising to see a "weather
market" during the next growing season. Supplies of major
commodities remain quite low
relative to potential usage.
From 1994 to 1996, U.S.
agricultural exports rose from
$43 billion to approximately
$60 billion. (Much of the
increase that occurred during
the past year was because of

higher commodity prices, not
increased volume.) The export
market continues to be
extremely important to
Nebraska's farmers. However,
it probably is unrealistic to
expect a repeat of recent growth
in the next couple of years.
Larger 1996 crops in Russia
and China are part of the reason. Greater availability of commodities from competing
exporters and a strengthening
dollar (which increases the ptice
to foreign buyers) also are
factors.
New production technology
offers considerable potential for
crop producers. Production of
genetically-engineered corn and
soybeans apparently went well
in 1996. (Primmy applications
were corn that is resistant to
European corn borer and
herbicide-resistant soybeans.)
Increased numbers of farmers
also are experimenting with precision farming, which means
micromanaging input applications, including seed, fertilizer
and pesticides, within a single
field. As has been the case in
the past, technology adaptation
will proceed fastest when there
is an economic incentive (high
commodity prices) for applying
it. Both biotechnology and precision farming have the potential to spur big changes in
Nebraska agriculture dming the
next decade.

Roy F:red.e:dck
agricultural commodities. Some
products, including ethanol
have depended, in part, on government subsidies. But in the
summer of 1996, even subsidies
weren't enough: Several of the
state's six ethanol plants either
reduced or halted production
because of high input (primarily
com) prices. As in livestock
feeding, high corn prices can
become too much of a good
thing.
When one considers the
importance and diversity of
Nebraska agriculture and the
final markets that are available
to our producers, perhaps the
following perspectives are worth
considering:
.. We need to keep production
moving ahead to meet
diverse demands of domestic and international
markets.
.. It would be ideal if growth in
demand occurred at about
the same rate as our ability
to increase production
through new technology.
.. Commodity prices should be
fairly stable from year to
year, but increase, on average, at least in line with
inflation.
Whether or not we will ever
approach these goals is, of
course, an open question.

One other area that bears
watching is nonfood uses of
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Freedom to arm
Management
Challenges
Larry Bitney

The Federal Agriculture Improvement and Reform (FAIR)
Act of I 996 was signed into law
on April 4, 1996. Most provisions of the new law will be
effective for seven years, 19962002. Sign up for the program,
which was completed in midAugust, was nearly 100 percent.
This is a transition program - a
transition to no government
feed grain and wheat payments
after the year 2002. While some
producers question whether
this will really happen, most are
not willing to bet the farm on
some form of government farm
income support beyond 2002.
While the FAIR Act provides
producers more freedom in
what they can plant, there are
no deficiency payments or
planting restrictions. We will
likely see more volatile market
prices for crops over the next
seven years. Without the
income-leveling effect of deficiency payments, producers will
experience more year-to-year
variation in their net income.
While this operating environment ptovides opportunity for
profits, risks will be higher. A
"business as usual" approach to
management and marketing
may not be good enough for
survival in the next few years.
In addition to price volatility, producers will face a more
competitive operating environment. Government payments
have averaged 26 percent of net
farm income in Nebraska over
the last 5 years, and 35 percent
over the last 10 years. Will the
"market" (domestic and foreign)
6

give producers additional
income to fill the void left by
declining government payments, or will there be fierce
competition, with only the low
cost producers surviving? 111ese
questions remain to be
answered. As an example of the
adjustments that producers will
face, let's look at irrigated corn
production. The market price
was greater than cost of production in only four of the last 10
years. The 10-year (1986-95)
average cost of production was
$2.46 per bushel (Nebraska
Farm Business Association).
while the weighted average market price for the same period
was $2.31, indicating a loss of
15 cents per bushel. But that
was ok, as deficiency payments
more than made up the difference. But, what about the next
ten years?
In the long run, if there are
no government payments, the
market price will tend to equal
the average production cost of
all producers. In the absence of
any significant cost-reducing
technologies, either the market
price will need to adjust upward, or we will see a decapitalization of land, resulting in a
lower corn production cost. The
latter will of course impact
highly leveraged and high cost
producers most severely.
The high commodity prices
of 1996 have postponed the
financial impact of the new farm
program for most Nebraska producers. Some outlook sources
feel that we have arrived at a
"$3 plateau" in corn prices. This

Larry Bitney

would certainly minimize the
need for adjustments. Others
feel that we could see $2 or
$2.25 corn again. If producers
want to position their business
to survive this price roller coaster, a new approach to business
management and marketing
may be needed. Producers who
want to survive will need to use
the management and marketing
tools that the top 5 percent
have been using. This is an
opportune time to develop a
strategic plan for the next 5-10
years.
The management team
needs to have a clear understanding of the direction they
want to go (goals). They must
realize that changes will likely
be necessary. Complete records
and financial analysis take on
an even greater role in decision
making. Knowing unit costs of
production and enterprise profitability is necessary in order to
make wise decisions on marketing and enterprise selection.
Producers who do not like to
keep and analyze records
should hire someone to do it for
them - it's that important. All
producers, including those who
hire their record keeping and
analysis done, will need to understand what the analyses are
telling them, and make business decisions based on their
actual performance.
Their marketing challenges,
as discussed by Jim Kendrick in
the next article, need to be an
integral part of the management
team's decision process.

Freedom to Farm
Marketing
Challenges
James Kendrick
My comments build on Larry
Bitney's discussion of the management challenges of the FAIR
Act of 1996. There, he observed:
a) Over the past 10 years,
Nebraska irrigated corn producers had a higher cost of production than the price they received
for corn at local elevators; b) On
average, any "profits" in corn production were obtained from governmental payments which
accounted for 35 percent of net
farm income; c) While governmental payments are still being made
to producers, those payments are
scheduled to terminate in 2002;
and d) Given the previous points,
prudent farm management dictates increased emphasis on
reducing costs of production and
establishment of reasonable goals
for the farm business.
My conversations with producers suggest tha.t some counter Bitney's conclusions by
assuming: a) Prices received by
producers have permanently
moved to a higher level where
reasonable profits can be
obtained without governmental
transfer payments; b) Over the
coming years, prices received in
the open market will be more
stable than in years past; and c)
If prices were to temporarily fall
from present levels, the governmental "safety net" would cushion the financial pain.
Responding to these arguments of denial in reverse order, I
note the FAIR Act has placed the
1996 "marketing assistance loan"
for com at $1.89 per bushel. Given
the cost of production of many
producers, this seems akin to
placing the safety net for a high
wire trapeze artist about two
inches above the stage floor. Fur-

thermore, other forms of governmental assistance (i.e.' welfare
payments) seem destined to
shrink given the current mood of
the body public.
Price stability has two dimensions: within a crop year
and between crop years. While
seasonal price patterns are generally predictable, next year's
prices have a good chance of being either higher, lower, or
about the same as this year's.
Stability is increased if there exists stored stocks in excess of
present needs. Price fluctuations were somewhat muted
when the government was aggressively stockpiling grains in
an attempt to lever prices
higher. Now, with the government withdrawal from the storage business, storage is
undertaken by the "commercials" who will hold purchased
grain only until they find a
buyer. With the cushioning effect of "surplus stocks" removed, one could conclude that
price instability, both within
and between years, will be
greater in the future than in the
past. Producer storage of grain
is unlikely to be effective in leveraging world prices higher or
in dampening year-to-year price
variability. Producer storage of
grains between crop years is not
generally a profitable enterprise
even if next year's prices were
higher since the "opportunity
cost" of unsold grain normally
exceeds any increase in price.
Finally, is it a "given" that
product prices have been
ratcheted upward to a new plateau? Most producers would
concede that U.S. agricultural

James Kendrick
products are sold on a global
market. One school of thought
concludes that if world production of foodstuffs remains unchanged, rising incomes in the
less developed areas of the
world will translate into greater
demand for U.S. agricultural
products and thus higher prices
for _producers. I raise two cautionary flags to this thought
process. First, the FAIR act and
the tighter restrictions on acres
entering the CRP program could
mean expansion of harvested
U.S. crop acres in the coming
years. Second, both the number
and productivity of foreign acres
in agricultural production seem
to be rising. Ultimately, in a
generally competitive market,
the long-term price trend will
move to a higher level, trend
lower, or remain where it is, depending on the trend in global
cost of producing foodstuffs.
This linkage between price and
cost implies that "extra generous" profits will be short-lived.
Where does this place the
prudent manager of agricultural
production? It places the manager in a competitive environment where the success or
failure of the farm firm will be
highly correlated to the
manager's ability to: a) Establish reasonable goals given resources available; b) Tightly
control production costs; and c)
Realize that price fluctuations
are probably the norm and to
use historic seasonal patterns
to set the price received (or
paid) at advantageous levels.
Mostly work, little play, no freebies, but rewards to those who
can readily adapt to changing
conditions.
7
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H. Douglas Jose
There have been a number
of changes in the crop insurance program that affect growers in Nebraska. The Federal
Agricultural Improvement and
Reform (FAIR) Act, better known
as "Freedom to Farm," requires
that producers either have
multi-peril crop insurance
coverage or sign a statement
waiving eligibility for any disaster-type programs for any
losses. This requirement does
not apply to emergency loans or
benefits in the non-insured
assistance program. It does
apply to eligibility for the
Market Transition Payments,
commodity loans or FmHA
loans.
Crop Revenue Coverage
(CRC). This was the major
change in crop insurance this
past year. CRC provides a revenue guarantee based on planting time price. It is available on
a pilot basis in Nebraska for
corn, soybeans and wheat. The
revenue guarantee will increase
~f the harvest time market ptice
IS above the base or planting
price. These p1ices are established by speciflc futures
market contract prices. For
example, the base price for corn
is 95 percent of the average
closing prices for the DEC
contract during the month of
February. The harvest price is

8

95 percent of the average closing prices for the DEC contract
during November.
Group Risk Plan (GRP}.
GRP coverage, which is based
on county yields, has been
available for a couple of years
for corn and soybeans. In 1997
it is also available for wheat in
93 counties. It minimizes record
keeping and works well in a
situation where farm yields follow the same year-to-year pattern as the county yields. The
absolute yields may differ. The
critical factor is how the two
yield series track.
1996 Participation. The
table below shows the participation in multiple peril crop insurance in Nebraska in 1996. It is
interesting to compare the
Actual Production History (APH)
and CRC programs for com and
soybeans during 1996, the first
year CRC was available. CRC
policies were in effect on 43 percent of the total commercial
corn acres insured and 42 percent of the soybean acres
insured. With APH com, farmers paid an average premium of
$3.27 per acre compared to
$9.10 per acre for CRC policies.
There are two important factors
to consider in comparing these
premiums. The APH acreage
includes many acres that were

H. Douglas Jose
only insured at the catastrophic
(CAT) coverage level (50 percent
of established yield and 60 percent of the maximum price or
30 percent of expected revenue).
No premium was charged for
this coverage except the $50 fee
per crop per county. CAT was
not available for CRC policies
and hence farmers paid a premium for all acres insured. The
maximum price election available for APH corn for 1996 was
$2.55 per bushel while the base
price for CRC was $2.93. With
the same coverage levels, the
premium for the CRC policy
would then be 15 percent
higher than the APH policy
based on price differences
alone. In addition, the added
revenue protection portion of
the CRC policy is not subsidized. The CRC policy carries
the same subsidy as the APH
policy on a per acre basis for
equivalent coverage.
By any measurement, there
was a significant response to
the CRC program by Nebraska
growers. The concept of providing revenue protection to stabilize income and support fmward
pricing of grain is an attractive
alternative. The performance of
the program over the next few
years will be closely monitored.

Crop Insurance Statistics, Nebraska, 1996 Crop Year
Category

Net acres

Liability

TP 1

ps2

Fp3

FPL4

FPTp6

FPPA6

APHCom
CRCCom

3,956
2,991

606,925
685,933

27,487
38,867

14,559
11,641

12,928
27,226

2.13
3.97

47.03
70.05

3.27
9.10

APH Soybeans
CRC Soybeans

1,296
935

158,579
154,529

6,842
8,205

3,336
2,502

3,506
5,703

2.21
3.69

51.24
69.51

2.71
6.10

APH G.Sorghum
APHWheat

830
1,923

85,139
122,943

5,299
10,198

2,414
4,825

2,885
5,373

3.39
4.37

54.44
52.69

3.48
2.79

38,074

3,208

1,354

1,854

4.87

57.79

10.87

APH D1ybeans

171

Source: FCIC 1996 Crop Year Statistics as of 09/30/96, nationwide summary by state.
(http://www.act.fcic. usda.gov I actuarial/ sumbus/96stcrp)
1 Total Premium in '000 $
2
Premium Subsidy in '000 $
3 Farmer Premium (Total Premium- Premium Subsidy) in '000$
4 Farmer Premium per $ 100 Liability
5 Farmer Premium as a percentage of Total Premium
6 Farmer Premium per acre
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USDA Report on
Agricultural
Concentration
Jeffrey S. Royer

On February 14, 1996,
Secretary of Agriculture Dan
Glickman appointed an Advisory Committee on Agricultural
Concentration and charged it
with investigating concentration
in the agricultural economy.
The committee was asked to
report its findings and its recommendations for addressing
concentration and any adverse
impacts of concentration by
June 7, 1996. Appointment of
the advisory committee resulted
from mounting public concerns
about increased concentration
and vertical integration in agriculture, particularly in the red
meat and poultry packing
industries.
According to the committee's report, the issues involving
agricultural concentration and
vertical integration are complex
and highly charged-eliciting
strong views and concerns
about the balance of economic
power, the use of governmental
power, and personal freedom.
On one hand, concentration
and vertical integration are
associated with positive results,
including more efficient production, risk management, international competitiveness, product
quality improvement, and food
safety advantages. On the other
hand, concentration and vertical integration can create problems and concerns, including
distorted price discovery,
unequal access to vital market
information, environmental
degradation, and dysfunctional

10

interactions among producers,
handlers, packing plants, distributors, and retailers.
In testimony before the
committee, a number of producers stated that they believed formula pricing, captive supplies,
and various forms of vertical
integration lead to thin markets
and the potential for price manipulation detrimental to farmers and ranchers. Contract
growers indicated that vertical
integration and contracting
arrangements provided them
financial stability, reduced risk,
and the ability to attract loans
allowing them to stay on the
farm or enter production. But
contract growers also suggested
that trends in vertical integration raise two important longterm issues-an imbalance of
power between integrators and
producers and environmental
problems associated with
extreme concentrations of animal and processing waste.
The committee found that
growing concentration in both
agricultural and nonagricultural
industries implies that
increased monitoring of the
economic and social consequences of concentration is
necessary. Although evidence
indicates that increased agricultural concentration has not
been associated with overt market power or the existence of
monopoly and monopsony profits, the potential has increased.
The committee also concluded

JeffreyS. Royer
that captive supplies and other
forms of vertical integration and
coordination are potentially
detrimental to both competition
and price discovery.
The committee's recommendations include the following:
• Stepping up antitrust
enforcement of current
regulations under the
Packers & Stockyards Act.
• Permitting price differentiation based only on differences in quality,
verifiable differences in
procurement costs, and
time of delivery.
• Establishing a disclosure
policy under which information on prices and
terms of trade for both
market and contract
transactions would be
disclosed by both buyers
and sellers.
• Taking steps to ensure
equitable sharing of risks
and rewards in vertical
chains and to avoid
exploitative behavior.
• Implementing consistent
and effective rules for animal feedlots that address
water, air, and odor pollution problems.
• Enabling producers to
bargain with first handlers
and processors collectively
through producer cooperatives and networks.

Agricult ral Land
Leasing: Trends
d Outlook
Bruce Johnson, H. Douglas Jose, and John Cole
The leasing of ag1icultural
land is as old as agriculture
itself. There are accounts of
leasing and tenancy throughout
the histories of virtually every
culture.
The institutional norms and
patterns of agricultural land
leasing historically have been
stable. Change has generally
been evolutionary, not revolutionary. Yet, as we move
towards the 21st Century, here
in the U.S. Heartland change is
certainly underway in the leasing of agricultural land. These
changes will hold important
implications for the state's agricultural sector in the years
ahead.
It appears the most pronounced trend is towards more
formal business contractual
arrangements. Several factors
are contributing to this change.

First, today's tenants tend
to be the competitive producers
in the area, using leasing as an
economically-sound method of
controlling the land base needed for today's farming scale and
efficiencies. In Nebraska, tenants are leasing parcels from an
average of three landowners. In
short, they are professional
farmers/ranchers who find a
more formal business orientation to leasing quite appropriate.
Second, much of the leased
land is owned by individuals
with limited and diminishing
direct ties to production agricul-

ture. Nearly half of Nebraska's
agricultural land base is now
leased; and the owners are of all
ages and occupations scattered
throughout the entire U.S. For
them more formal arrangements, perhaps even with the
hired services of a professional
farm manager, will be increasingly important.
Third, government policy
and regulations as well as general liability questions regarding
the environment are requiring
more accountability on the part
of both landowners and their
tenants. This means documentation of all activities associated
with each parcel of agricultural
land. Leasing activity is quickly
moving from an early 20th
Century rural culture to 21st
Century business sophistication.
Another trend is for agricultural land leasing to move
towards more economic refinement and frequency in negotiating rental agreements. Both
landowners and tenants are
moving the process in this
direction, realizing that economic equity and fairness is the
basis of profitable, long-term
economic partnerships. Recent
changes in share-rental
arrangements are evidence of
this. For example, the shift in
farming practices from mechanical weed control to chemical
weed control applied by custom
operators or input suppliers has
led many landowners to renegotiate their input shares to not

Bruce Johnson

H. Douglas Jose

John Cole

include the custom application
expense. Another example
involves new seed varieties
being developed with incorporated pest control attributes. In
this case, tenants may want to
renegotiate with their landlords
if seed costs are not now shared
in the share rental contract.
As for cash lease, contracts,
there is growing interest among
participants to either renegotiate periodically - every year or
two, or consider longer-term
leases based on long-term commodity trends. The interest in
recent months has been indicative of this. Favorable crop
(Continued on next page)
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prices and recent shifts in the
government farm program have
been a "wake up call" to cropland owners to reexamine their
cash leases. As a result, 1997
cash rental rates for cropland
may well be 8 to 12 percent
higher than year-earlier levels.
However, when commodity
prices edge downward and farm
program payments subside, the
cash rents for succeeding years
will likely decline as well. The
fact that rental rate adjustments need to be both upward
and downward depending on
the circumstances currently
evident in the grazing areas of
the state, where tenants are
now urging for some downward
movement of grazing land rents.
With the ranching economy still
in a slump, 1997 rental rates

could be down somewhat from
1996 levels.
In short, we can expect
greater and more frequent
adjustment in cash rental rates
in the years ahead as both sides
of the negotiating table grow in
economic sophistication. Even
within cropshare leasing,
appropriate adjustments to
shares will be made to better
reflect the relative contributions
which each party brings to the
contract.
Finally, a trend of recent
years which is likely to continue
is that of keen competition for
rental properties. The structure
of agriculture continues to move
towards farm consolidation into
larger, more efficient operations.
Leasing allows the ownership of

land to remain in relatively
small parcels while at the same
time providing the consolidation
of these holdings into larger,
more viable-sized production
units. The implication is obvious. The successful tenants in
this environment will be the
professional tenants who offer a
higher quality of services to
landowners than those of their
competitors. Not only will the
land be profitably farmed but
the land resource will be properly stewarded. There will be
"truth in leasing" and a high
degree of professionalism. In
turn, a multi-year partnership
with the land owners will tend
to emerge to the benefit of both
parties.

Streamflows and
Irrigation in the
Frenchman Creek
Basin

Osei Yeboah

Osei Yeboah, Maurice Baker and Glenn A. Helmers

There has been considerable
discussion about the impact of
irrigation development on
streamflows in the Republican
River Basin. This interest has
intensified with Kansas arguing
that Nebraska is failing to meet
the terms of the Republican
River Interstate Compact which
allocates the basin water
between Colorado, Kansas and
Nebraska. The compact allocates water by subbasin; therefore, any analysis must consider
each subbasin. One of these is
Frenchman Creek.
Recorded streamflows at
Culbertson (near the mouth of
Frenchman Creek) have
declined from approximately
40,000 cubic feet per second
(cfs) annually in 1950 to
approximately 14,000 cfs in
1994. We analyzed the causes
of this decline for factors for
which there were data. One factor examined was the number of
registered irrigation wells in
Frenchman drainage area. For
example, registered wells in
Chase County increased from
134 in 1961 to 1,422 in 1994.
During the 1970s, the number
of wells increased 131 percent
from 541 in 1970 to 1,252 in
1980. Statistical analysis indicates that the streamflow
declined an average of 69 cfs for
each registered well located in

townships which are not adjacent to the stream but were
unrelated to the number of
wells close to Frenchman.
Many wells close to the
stream are used to supplement
surface water supplies from the
irrigation districts supplied
from Enders Reservoir. The
pumping capacities of these
wells may be less than those
farther from the stream. Any
return flow from the close wells
quickly reaches Frenchman
Creek so the stream flow is not
reduced as much. There may be
other factors which partially
explain reduced streamflow.
One frequently mentioned is
improved precipitation retention
on cropland; however, data are
not available for this factor.
Water availability clearly
has an economic impact on
Nebraska since it could affect
the number of irrigated crop
acres in the basin. Acres of irrigated corn in Chase County, for
example, increased from 1,400
in 1950 to 125,000 in 1994.
Much of this growth took place
in the 1970s, when irrigated
corn acres nearly tripled, increasing from 38,000 in 1970 to
nearly 111,000 by 1980. Reductions in the available water supply may have a minor economic
effect if the same number of
acres can be irrigated by being

Maurice Baker

Glenn A. Helmers

able to maintain output with
low cost improved irrigation efficiency. If reduced acreage is
required, not only will there be
a reduced income for producers
but also for input suppliers and
output handlers.
The situation in the Republican River basin requires careful analysis and provides an
opportunity to discover the possible impact not only in that
part of the state but elsewhere.
A better understanding of the
situation will lead to more
informed policy decisions.
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Changes in Custom
Rates in Nebraska:
1976-1996
William Miller and H. Douglas Jose
Changes in custom harvest
rates over the years reflect
changes in the price structure
in the agricultural economy and
technological changes in
machinery. Every two years, the
Department of Agricultural Economics has collected information from custom operators in
Nebraska. This information is
not drawn from a random
sample of custom operators, but
consists of people who may provide machinery services. These
people have been identified by
Extension Educators and others
familiar with local activities. It
is interesting to view the results
of these surveys over the past
20 years and note what policy
implications may be drawn from
the changes that have occurred.
It appears that some custom
rates are slow to change in spite
of significant changes that have
occurred in machinery, labor,
and fuel costs during the past
20 years. Table I presents custom rates for selected field
operations and indexes for components of custom services from
1976 to 1996. For example, The
average charge per acre in
Nebraska for moldboard plowing
increased from $6.19 in 1976 to
$10.23 in 1996 (Table 1). That is
a 65 percent increase. But cost
indexes for powered machinery,
other machinery, wages and
fuel have increased over 100
percent during the same period.
The moldboard plow change can
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William Miller

be contrasted with drilling small
grains. This drilling activity
increased from $2.78 per acre to
$7.04 which is a 153 percent
increase.
A second interesting feature
of the rates is the cyclical
nature of the changes. In years
when the agricultural economy
is strong in Nebraska rates tend
to rise. In contrast, during periods of economic distress, the
rates may stay constant or even
decline. This has occurred even
though the indexes of cost,
except for fuel, have risen
steadily throughout this 20year period. The best example of
tbe cyclical nature of Nebraska
custom rates occurred in 1986
when many custom rates
declined from the comparable
1984 rates. The agricultural
economy was in severe recession during this period.
Why are prices of the custom fees not consistent with
changes in cost indexes? There
are several explanations that
have been suggested as plausible reasons for this situation.
Some observers suggest that
farmers may peliorm many custom operations for relatives or
close neighbors so they may not
charge full cost to them. Others
suggest farmers may charge
only part of the cost because
they are trying to spread the
fixed cost of an expensive
machine over more acres and
are willing to accept only

H. Douglas Jose

modest returns above operating
cost to do so. Still others suggest that the publication of
these data freezes rates because
landlords point to the published
rate as the competitive rate that
should be charged.
While these plausible explanations have some merit, it is
most likely that rates change
more slowly or more rapidly
than cost indexes because of
technological change and the
proportion of the indexes that
make up a particular custom
operation. Just because wages,
for example, rise more rapidly
than the custom fees should
not imply that wage cost per
acre should rise at all. Introducing larger or faster equipment
may result in falling labor cost
per acre even though wages
rise. The improvement in fuel
use per horsepower hour, the
size and the speed of equipment
are other examples of the
impact of technology on the
custom fees per acre. For example, larger machinery may result

Table I. Selected Custom Rates 1 and Cost Indexes 2 : 1976-1996.
- - - - - - - - - - - - - - - Custom Rates - - - - - - - - - - - - - - -

- - - - - - - - - - Cost Indexes - - - - - - - - - - -

Year

Plow

Seed

Cult

Bale

Combine

Power

Machines

FUel

Wages

1996
1994
1992
1990
1988
1986
1984
1982
1980
1978
1977
1976

$10.23
10.34
10.35
9.36
9.00
8.64
9.18
9.08
7.93
6.36

$7.04
6.94
6.38
6.09
5.81
5.32
5.45
5.02
4.30
3.31

$5.63
5.44
5.24
4.86
4.94
4.76
4.89
4.55
4.16
3.05

$6.93
6.50
6.49
6.34
6.01
5.92
6.10
5.78
5.67
4.82

$20.81
20.78
20.30
19.61
19.32
18.77
19.39
19.39
19.91
13.03

6.19

2.78

2.75

5.06

10.85

261
238
219
202
181
176
181
165
136
109
100
91

279
253
233
216
198
181
180
160
132
108
100
92

206
182
199
206
167
162
201
210
188
105
100
93

229
221
209
191
171
160
152
166
126
107
100
93

Sources: Nebraska Farm Custom Rates, NebGuide G75-207, 1976-1996 and Revised Prices Received and Paid Indexes,
United States, Bulletin 917, National Agricultural Statistics Services, USDA.
1Plow

Dollars per acre for any moldboard plow up to 1992 and one without plow packer for 1994 and later years.
Dollars per acre to drill small grains with any drill up to 1986 but only drills with disc openers for 1988 and later
years.
Dollars per acre to cultivate row crops with any cultivator up to 1990 but with only conventional cultivator for
Cult=
1988 and later years.
Dollars per bale to bale hay in large round bales.
Bale=
Combine= Dollars per acre to combine soybeans; flat rate only.

=
Seed=

2 Indexes of prices paid by farmers with a base of 1997 = 100. Power= tractors and self-propelled machinery; Machines =
other machinery.

in lower costs per acre for a particular operation due to the
increased acreage covered even
though the initial cost of the
machine is higher. In contrast,
technological change in some
operations has improved the
quality of the operation enough

to result in significantly higher
fees. For example, contrast the
change in planters from the
conventional planter to a no-till
planter with seed monitors that
give more accurate placement of
the seed and operate in a high
residue environment. An

increased rate charged may be
justified due to the increased
service provided. Care must be
taken in the use of indexes
because the products that are
measured for a price index may
change over time as new technologies replace old ones.
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Machinery
Replacement
Glenn A. Helmers

Machinery replacement is
one of the most complex issues
facing agricultural crop producers. Traditionally this has been
directed at questions of optimum trading time, leasing vs.
ownership, and the necessary
acreage sizes to achieve cost
economics each in relation to a
specific machine. However,
machinery replacement is even
more complex when machinery
is considered as a set. Machines
are increasingly linked to each
other so that decisions on one
machine may involve other
machines. For example, planters, cultivators, and combine
heads must be synchronized in
terms of four- vs. six-row units.
Hence, decisions such as moving from eight-row to twelve-row
production· may involve more
than one machine.
Related is the question of
the economics of multiple power
units. This issue revolves
around how much operating
efficiency increases when using
a small tractor for small power
requirements, medium for
medium sized tasks, etc. compared to, for example, using one
large tractor for all tasks.
For firms which have no
growth plans the optimum combination of machines and sizing
of power units to other machinery is difficult because among
other factors, crop choice and
available labor affects that
choice. These decisions are even
more difficult where the firm
expects to expand and is contemplating major machinery
changes at some uncertain
future time. We break this down
into questions of 1) flexibility
and evolving sets and 2) multiple power units.
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Flexibility and Evolving Sets

Glenn A. Helmers

A convenient and useful
manner of thinking related to
an efficient machinery set is to
focus on an "ideal" set were one
to purchase each component
"fresh" rather than the set currently in place. Yet the ideal set
can be elusive particularly if the
firm expects to grow. Further,
even if an ideal set can be determined for a particular time
point in the future, the best
sequence of changing machines
to achieve that set is complex.
One approach is to replace machinery as needed with that future set in mind rather than
waiting to make several major
adjustments at that future time
point. This can obviously result
in some machine overcapacity.
The ownership cost of overcapacity may not be as large as
commonly perceived. Often
depreciation is viewed as a cost
which is incurred regardless of
use. Hence, overcapacity is
sometimes viewed as costly
because of high perceived
depreciation costs. Increasingly,
however, depreciation is viewed
as more use related rather than
age related. Overcapacity does
involve an increased capital
investment cost, however. A
major question is how large this
cost of additional invested capital is under conditions of overcapacity.

A similar issue to that discussed above is "overcapacity"
in terms of multiple power
units. Generally it has been
common to economically view
multiple power units critically.
Perhaps one reason for this is a
perceived high depreciation cost
resulting from multiple tractors.
However, if as discussed above,
depreciation is considered as
largely use based, wear-out
costs per year could be similar
for two compared to one power
unit (or three vs. two, etc.).
While capital investment costs
generally will be higher with two
power units compared tci one,
the operating cost efficiencies of
matching power requirements
to power sources may outweigh
the increased capital cost. While
it is difficult to be specific, some
principles are:

Another approach for dealing with the problem of
sequencing machine replacement is to use machine leasing
to increase flexibility and delay
long-run ownership decisions
until arriving at the desired
acreage size. Where custom
machine services are available,

3) Types of agriculture make a
difference. Where width can
be easily added to towed
machinery, single-powered
units tend to be more efficient compared to multiple
units.

this is another alternative
provided that the service is
available in a timely manner.
Multiple Power Units

1) Where there is a wide range
of power needs, advantages
exist for multiple power
units.
2) Multiple power units are
more efficient in labor situations involving more than
one person.

Feeder Cattle
Outlook
1997
Allen C. Wellman
Allen C. Wellman
The July 1, 1996 U.S. total
cattle inventory was estimated
to be 112 million head, down 1
percent from a year earlier. This
is the first reduction in total
U.S. cattle inventories since
1990.
The number of heifers being
held as beef cow replacements
on July 1 was reported 4 percent smaller than last year's,
and 9 percent below July 1994
levels. Heavier beef cow-herd
culling and reduced numbers of
beef cow replacements will lead
to a smaller 1997 calf crop. Beef
production will likely continue
to grow until mid-1997.
Feeder cattle and calf prices
are likely to stabilize in 1997,
although range and forage conditions can move prices either
up or down. Returns to cow-calf
operations in 1997 will likely be
negative, the third year of red
ink. There is a chance that
prices may be better than in
1996. The condition of the feed
grain crop will influence feeder
cattle prices by mid-year and
into the fall.

number of cattle outside feedlots and not kept for breeding is
up about 1.4 million head from
1995.
Feeder cattle imports during
the year will increase feeder
supplies. Shipments of feeder
cattle from Mexico and Canada
will add nearly a million head to
feeder cattle numbers.
Range, Forage and Feed
Conditions
High feed grain prices continue to be negative to feeder
cattle prices. For example, for
700-800 pound feeder steers,
each 10 cents per bushel
increase in corn prices raises
the projected breakeven by
about 40 cents per cwt. Or, to
keep breakeven unchanged,
feedlot operators would
decrease the amount paid for
feeder steers by about 60 cents
per cwt.
Should 1997 turn out to be
a bumper corn year then declining feed grain prices by midyear could turn prices around
for feeder cattle.

Feeder Cattle Supplies
Prices
The July inventory of steers
over 500 pounds and calves
under 500 pounds was equal to
that of the previous year. The
number of heifers not kept for
replacement increased 1 percent compared to last year. The
total supply of feeder cattle is
up slightly from a year ago. the

slightly below year ago price
levels. During the last half of
1997, heavy feeder steer prices
may trade above 1996 prices if
abundant feed supplies are on
the horizon.
Prices for 500-600 pound
steer calves will have the same
potential ups and downs as the
yearling steers. Prices on steer
calves late in 1996 were averaging near $60 per cwt., slightly
below 1995 prices. Early 1997
seasonal strength may hold
prices in the $60s but steer
calves are likely to be under
some downward pressure if feed
grain prices stay near the top of
the current range. Prices for
500-600 pound steer calves
during the last half of 1997 may
average near or somewhat above
1996 levels.
Declining feed grain prices
and uptrending fed cattle prices
could improve the feeder cattle
and calf outlook by mid-1997.
Feeder cattle and calf marketing plans should be continually updated in 1997. Marketing
strategies, including retained
ownership, should be evaluated
as market prices and production costs change.

Prices for yearling steers in
late 1996 were trading $20-22
per cwt. below the average for
the 1990-94 period. As long as
feed grain prices stay near harvest levels, then early 1997
yearling steer prices may trade
in the low $60s per cwt.,
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Slaughter attle
Outlook
1997
Allen C. Wellman
Allen C. Wellman
Slaughter cattle prices during 1996 ranged between $56
and $72 per cwt. The difference
between the highs and lows in
1995 was about $14 per cwt.
Beef production in 1996 was up
in every quarter. Cow slaughter
was up sharply in 1996, at times
beef cow slaughter was up 25
percent from year earlier levels.
Total beef production for the
year ended up 3-4 percent above
1995. Returns to cattle feeders
in 1996 were negative January
through July but then turned
positive until nearly the end of
the year.
Supply Forecasts
Placement of cattle into feedlots and resulting feedlot inventories in the first half of 1997 are
likely to run near or slightly
below the same period in 1996.
Above average cow slaughter,
continuing a trend that started
in 1992, will add to beef production in the first half of the year
but not at the levels experienced
in 1996.
Feedlot placements in the
last half of 1997 will reflect market conditions at the time the
decisions are being made.
Declining feed grain prices,
somewhat smaller feeder cattle
supplies and some optimism for
increased international beef
trade will likely generate some
increase in placements. A long
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string of negative feedlot closeouts will impact placement decisions by fall.
The slow expansion in total
cattle numbers that started in
1991-92 appears to have ended
in 1996. Beef production the
second half of 1997 is expected
to be slightly below year earlier
levels.
Demand Prospects
Beef continues its long-term struggle for market share.
Currently, per capita consumption and demand for beef has
stabilized. Retail beef prices
declined in 1996-down nearly
a dime per retail pound from
1995. Beef and veal exports
were running 15-20 percent
above a year earlier in late
1996.
It appears that beef promotion will play an important role
in shaping consumer preferences. Beef educational programs should be increased to
expand the consumers' knowledge about the wholesomeness
of beef. Competition from other
red meats and poultry will continue to increase.
Marketing Plan
Marketing plans for cowcalf operators, growers and
cattle feeders should be

formulated and updated as market information changes and
more is known about range,
pasture conditions and the
1997 feed grain crop. Price risk
management strategies should
be formulated to handle a wide
range of market outcomes.
Price Forecasts
First quarter 1997 prices are
expected to average near or
above year ago levels. Prices
averaged $61-62 per cwt. in the
January-March period in 1996.
Second quarter 1997 prices
are also expected to average
above the April-June 1996
prices. Prices averaged $59-60
during the 2nd quarter of 1996.
Prices the second half of
1997 are likely to continue to
average near to slightly above
1996 levels. Producers and
feeders should always be on the
lookout for price hedging opportunities or chances to reduce
costs. Feeder cattle prices may
stabilize in 1997 and by the
second half of the year might be
showing a little strength if forage and feed conditions are
average or better.

g
Slaughter
Outlook
1997
Allen C. Wellman
Allen C. Wellman
USDA hog inventory reports
confirmed that hog numbers
declined in 1996 compared to a
year ago. Omaha cash slaughter
hog prices ranged from near
$41 to just over $65 in 1996.
Hog prices averaged in the low
$50s per cwt., for the year, up
over $10 per cwt. from 1995.
Supply Forecasts
Recent hog and pig reports
suggest that inventories may
decline slightly, about 1 to 2
percent the first two quarters of
1997. It appears likely that hog
numbers the last two quarters
of 1997 may be up compared to
the second half of 1996.
Hog producers will be
closely watching corn prices in
1997. Higher feed eosts may
encourage producers to reduce
,farrowings or to decrease market weights. Generally, market
weights for slaughter hogs continue to increase. Average
weights are near 258 lbs. per
market hog, up from 240 lbs.
ten years ago.
Hog Industry Trends
The structure of the hog
industry continues to change.
Generally there are fewer and

larger hog operations. A recent
survey indicated there are 66
hog producers who marketed
over 50,000 head per year and
9 firms that marketed over
500,000 head per year.
The average inventory on
hog farms has more than
doubled in the last 10 years.
The number of pigs sold per sow
per year has increased an average of 1. 7 percent per year since
1935.
In the 1970s over 30 percent
of slaughter hogs were purchased at public markets, today
it is less than 5 percent. Eighty
percent of the hogs were sold on
live weight basis, today nearly
70 percent are sold on a carcass
merit basis.
Demand Prospects
Pork demand has remained
remarkably strong during the
last two or three years. Pork
promoters are indicating that
additional opportunities exist
for expanding the market for
pork. Pork exports were running
sharply ahead of year earlier
levels in 1996. The U.S.
exported less than 1 percent of
pork produced in the 1960s.
Today we are exporting over 5
percent of U.S. production.

Marketing Plan
The objective of your marketing plan strategy is to attain
monthly-yearly average selling
prices that are $3-5 per cwt.
higher than average prices
reported by the cash market.
Producers must watch for forward pricing opportunities that
achieve pricing goals and
reduce price risk. Price volatility
and a $15-20 cash price range
should be planned for in 1997.
Price Forecasts
Cash hog prices in 1997 are
expected to trade below 1996
levels. Prices in the first half of
the year should average in the
low- to mid-$50s. Seasonal
price strengths could result in
summer prices in the upper$50s. Prices for the second half
of the year may average in the
upper-$40s. Hog producers'
production decisions for the
second half of 1997 will depend
on production cost and market
hog price trends in the first half
of the year. At midyear feed
grain production and price
prospects, supplies of competing meats and pork export
levels also will be influencing
the market.
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Grain Outlook
for 1997
Lynn H. Lutgen

Lynn H. Lutgen

The year 1996 was one of
turmoil, record setting prices,
high expectations, and disappointing fall prices. Farmers
saw record setting prices in the
spring and early summer for old
crop, when corn prices topped
$5 based on a tightness of
supply with only 426 million
bushels projected carry-out for
September 1996. Wheat and
soybeans also experienced a
tightness of supply with projected carry-out of 376 million
bushels of wheat and 183 million bushels of soybeans. The
market in 1995-96 was a tight
supply driven market supported
by a fairly strong demand picture, leading to record level
prices.
The market for 1996 production will be a demand driven
market, which could mean fairly
decent prices or a market that
will remain stagnant throughout the market year. Either way
we will not see the record setting prices that we saw in 1996.
Production increased in all
three major crops. Com, despite
a troublesome planting season
back east, increased from 7.374
billion bushels in 1995 to 9.012
billion bushels in 1996, wheat
increased from 2.183 to 2.282
billion bushels in 1996, and
soybean production jumped
from 2.177 to 2.346 billion
bushels for 1996 based on
USDA's October supply and
demand report. The projected
ending stocks for September
1997 was not a overly burden20

some increase from September
1996, and normally wouldn't
have caused much of a price
reaction. The problem was this
increase took place at the same
time that the market saw a substantially short run decline in
demand. The combination of
these two factors led to unexpected price declines for new
1996 fall grain.
During the winter marketing
months, we can expect a market
responding to increased
demand and the South American soybean crop. It appears at
this time that much of the grain

in the U.S. will move into storage and that farmers will be
reluctant to sell at the harvest
prices. This could very well be a
market year where the low
prices will occur during the harvest period, with a modest
increase following harvest. The
recovery in early 1997 will be
very dependent on world
demand. When reviewing the
following supply and demand
tables, one should pay particular attention to the projected
ending stocks numbers. Note
that corn more than doubled
and soybeans are approaching
the 200 million bushel range.

U.S. Corn Supply and Demand
1994-95

1995-96

1996-97*

Million Acres
Area
Harvested

72.9

65.0

73.3

Bushels
Yield per
harvested acre

138.6

113.5

123.0

Million Bushels
Beginning Stocks
Production
Imports
Supply, total
Food/Seed
Feed and Residual
Exports
Use, total
Ending Stocks total
Average Price

850
10,103
10
10,962
1,691
5,536
2,177
9,405
1,558
$2.26

1,558
7,374
17
8,949
1,583
4,725
2,215
8,522
426
$3.24

426
9,012
10
9,448
1,670
4,925
1,950
8,545
903
$2.80-3.20

*Projections for the 1996-97 crops are USDA's World Outlook Board expectations
of supply and disappearance as of October 11, 1996.

U.S. Soybeans Supply and Demand
1994-95

1995-96

1996-97*

Million Acres
Area
Harvested

60.9

61.6

63.4

Bushels
Yield per
harvested acre

41.4

35.3

37.0

Million Bushels
Beginning Stocks
Production
Supply, total
Crush
Exports
Seed/Residual
Use, total
Ending Stocks total
Average Price

209
2,517
2,731
1,405
838
153
2,396
335
$5.48

335
2,177
2,517
1,370
845
118
2,333
183
$6.77

183
2,346
2,535
1,375
850
115
2,340
195
$6.50-7.40

*Projections for the 1996-97 crops are USDA's World Outlook Board expectations
of supply and disappearance as of October 11, 1996.

U.S. Wheat Supply and Demand
1994-95

1995-96

1996-97*

Million Acres
Area
Harvested

61.8

61.0

62.9

Bushels
Yield per
harvested acre

37.6

35.8

36.4

Million Bushels
Beginning Stocks
Production
Imports
Supply, total
Food/Seed
Feed and Residual
Exports
Use, total
Ending Stocks total
Average Price

568
2,321
92
2,981
942
344
1,188
2,475
507
$3.45

507
2,183
68
2,757
988
152
1.241
2,381
376
$4.55

376
2,282
70
2,728
1,008
325
925
2,258
470
$4.10-4.70

*Projections for the 1996-97 crops are USDA's World Outlook Board expectations
of supply and disappearance as of October 11, 1996.
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Seasonal Dry Bean
Prices: The Stora e
Lottery
Chyi-lyi (Kathleen) Liang, Dillon M. Feuz, and R. Garth Taylor

Prices for most agricultural
commodities exhibit a distinct
seasonal pattern. For grains,
prices reach the annual low at
harvest and then rise throughout year to again drop the following harvest. Price increases
between harvest should equal
storage costs plus an opportunity cost on the foregone interest income that would have
been realized from immediate
sale of the grain. Because of
competitive market forces, the
long term average return to
storage will be close to a breakeven deal. If storage was always
(never) profitable then most
individuals would (not) store
and the market prices would
quickly adjust to bid the profit
(loss) out of storage.
However, many factors disrupt an orderly seasonal pattern
of agricultural commodity
prices: (1) unforeseen demands
for the product during the year,
(2) expectations of crop yields
for the following year, (3) changing government programs, and
(4) general economic conditions.
Large profits or losses from storage are frequently a consequence of one or more of these
unforeseen events. The farmer's
decision on the most profitable
combination of storage and
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sales throughout the year is
therefore somewhat of a lottery
with an expected value of zero.
For d1y edible beans, the
market disruptions appear to
outweigh the orderly seasonal
price patterns. Historical prices
for Pinto and Great Northern
beans were obtained from USDA
for the western Nebraskaeastern Wyoming market for the
1983-84 to 1995-96 crop years.
Seasonal patterns and price statistics are summarized for Pinto
and Northern varieties. The
hmizontal line is the average
price for each month, the box is
the standard deviation about
the mean, and the vertical line
depicts the range for that month
over time. The average price
line, being close to horizontal,
shows very little seasonality in
dry bean prices. However, the
standard deviation and the
range increase significantly
throughout the year. Thus there
are wide price fluctuations
which increase after harvest.
A market plan which calls
for routine storage of beans
with the plan to sell later in the
same crop year will not be profitable on average. However,
storage of beans over more than
one crop year may be profitable

DillonM. Feuz

R. Garth Taylor

if marketed on one of the
monthly price-up spikes that
occurs. In armlyzing the raw
price data these price spikes
tend to occur about once every
one to four years. The lottery
with dry bean storage is that a
ptice spike will occur before
storage costs have exceeded the
additional revenue obtained
from selling on the higher
market.

Great Northern Bean Prices
Western Nebraska-Eastern Wyoming, 1983·-96
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Farm Financial
Analysis
Gary Bredensteiner

Gary Bredensteine:r

Data compiled by the
Nebraska Farm Business Association provide Nebraska ag
producers an opportunity to
analyze their business over time
as compared to other producers.
Historic trend data may not be a
perfect indicator of future economic conditions, but does
provide valuable insights to
individual operators concerning
the relative profitability of their
business and its various components. Knowledge of past performance is critical for future
management decisions.
Ag production is risky and
subject to volatility. 1995 data
compiled from 160 Nebraska
farmers and ranchers enrolled
either in the Nebraska Farm
Business Association (NFBA) or
Nebraskaland Farm and Ranch
Management Education Program (NFRM) provided excellent
examples. The spread from high
to low of Net Farm Income per
operator exceeded $270,000.
Operating Expense Ratio (Total
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Farm Operating ExpenseInterest Paid) + Gross Farm
Income ranged from less than
40 percent to over 150 percent.
Interest as a per cent of Gross
Income ranged from 0 percent
to over 35 percent. Return on
Assets (ROA) ranged from -35.5
percent to +39.4 percent. percent of Debt compared to Market Value of Farm Assets ranged
from 0 percent to 114 percent.
Note the following trends
for the average ag producer
enrolled in the NFBA financial
analysis program:
Continuing the trend of
recent years, the average operator supplemented Farm Income
with Nonfarm Income to generate adequate income for Family
Living and Taxes. In 1995, average Family Living and Income
Taxes of $41,616 exceeded Net
Farm Income (per operator) by
approximately $7,000.
Recent changes in Government Farm Programs, continued

market price volatility, weather
challenges, as well as capital
and operating cost increases all
point to the continued need for
active financial management in
today's production agriculture.
Risk protection begins with
good records and financial
analysis of the business.
NFBA is operated through
Nebraska Cooperative Extension, IANR. University of
Nebraska-Lincoln. For information about NFBA, contact the
Nebraska Farm Business Association, University of Nebraska,
110 Mussehl Hall, P.O. Box
830719, Lincoln NE 685830719. Or call402/472-1399.
As mentioned, 1995 data
collection was a joint effort with
the Nebraskaland Farm and
Ranch Management Education
Program (NFRM). Information
regarding NFRM can be
obtained from your nearest
Nebraska Community College.
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Interest Paid - All Farms
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Nebraska Ag Producers:
ow Are They Doing
ompared to the Past?
at Do They See for
the Future?

John C. Allen

John C. Allen and Amy M. Smith

Nebraska's 53,000 agricultural producers have continued
to be on a roller coaster ride for
profits since the 1980s. Since
then, a continued decline in the
number of producers presents a
potential problem for refilling, at
least some of the slots, vacated
by retiring producers. While
income is an important aspect
of farming and ranching, how
an individual perceives his or
her life also plays a role in
whether intergenerational
transfer will occur among family
members.
Previous research on agricultural producers in the mid1980s showed that farmers had
an overall higher subjective
well-being score when compared to non-producers
(Molnar, 1985). Other social
scientists have also found that
farming has been associated
with a higher quality of life
linked to rural residence, family
involvement, and occupational
self-determination (Cochrane,
1979). While ag producers rank
very low in their expressions of
happiness, they have been
among the highest in describing
themselves as satisfied with
their work when compared to
non-farmers.
The first baseline Nebraska
Rural Poll was conducted in
March and April of 1996 to

address the question of how
Nebraska farmers and ranchers
are doing. They were asked to
rank how they believe they compare to five years ago, how they
compare to their parents, and
how they see themselves ten
years in the future. A selfadministered questionnaire
was returned by 2,754 rural
Nebraskans (45 percent
response rate), with 389 of
these rural residents being
farmers or ranchers.
The survey respondents
were asked three questions
about general well-being. They
were:
1) All things considered, do
you think you are better or
worse off than five years
ago?
2) All things considered, do
you think you are better or
worse off than your parents
when they were your age?
3) All things considered, do
you think you will be better
off ten years from now than
you are today?
Figure 1 shows the comparison of how farmers and ranchers responded when compared
to non-farmer Nebraska residents.

As the figure illustrates, 36
percent of the farmer /ranchers

AmyM. Smith

say they are worse off than
five years ago compared to 24
percent of the non-farmerranchers. When compared to
their parents, 49.5 percent of
the ag producers say they are
better off compared to 59
percent for the non-farmer/
ranchers. About 31 percent of
the farmer /ranchers say they
are worse off compared to their
parents, while only 22 percent
of the non-farmers reported
being worse off. About 20 percent of rural residents regardless of farming status report
they are about the same as their
parents.
What does the future look
like ten years in the future for
Nebraska ag producers? Thirtyfour percent of the producers
expect to be better off in ten
years than they are today.
About 4 percent more nonfarmers believe they will be
better off. Thirty-one percent of
the producers believe they will
be worse off ten years from now,
which is about 3 percent higher
than non-producers. About 35
percent of rural residents,
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Figure 1. Well-Being and Farming Status*
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*Source: Nebraska Rural Poll, 1996

regardless of farming status,
believe they will be about the
same.
This data indicates that, on
average, farmers in Nebraska do
not believe they are doing better
than in the past, nor better
than their parents, nor do they
believe their overall situation
will improve in the next ten
years. The historical pattern of
farmers having higher levels of
satisfaction and well-being

when compared to non-farmer I
ranchers has not continued in
Nebraska. Factors previously
reported to influence higher
levels of satisfaction for producers include rural residence,
family involvement in the business, and occupational determination. These factors may have
changed, and this change is
reflected in a low overall ag producer well-being level. It should
be noted that these flndings are

a snapshot in time, and that
time series data over the next
few years will give us a more
accurate picture of how ag producers are perceiving their lives.
The question still exists
whether younger family members are seeing this declining
well-being as a reason to not
join the ranks of Nebraska ag
producers.
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